Historical Echo: When Chips Became the New Oil
![clean data visualization, flat 2D chart, muted academic palette, no 3D effects, evidence-based presentation, professional infographic, minimal decoration, clear axis labels, scholarly aesthetic, a cracked silicon wafer, smooth polished surface with fine metallic tracing resembling both integrated circuits and world map borders, lit from below with soft upward glow casting sharp linear shadows, resting on a translucent data grid showing trend lines and GDP projections in muted blue and gray tones, atmosphere of quiet gravity and structural tension [Bria Fibo]](https://081x4rbriqin1aej.public.blob.vercel-storage.com/viral-images/3f1968ff-f40b-4fd3-9994-b01c84772d0d_viral_4_square.png "clean data visualization, flat 2D chart, muted academic palette, no 3D effects, evidence-based presentation, professional infographic, minimal decoration, clear axis labels, scholarly aesthetic, a cracked silicon wafer, smooth polished surface with fine metallic tracing resembling both integrated circuits and world map borders, lit from below with soft upward glow casting sharp linear shadows, resting on a translucent data grid showing trend lines and GDP projections in muted blue and gray tones, atmosphere of quiet gravity and structural tension [Bria Fibo]")
If access to advanced lithography remains concentrated in a single jurisdiction, then semiconductor production will increasingly reflect the geopolitical alignments of its suppliers rather than the efficiency of its markets.
Back in 1946, U.S. policymakers watched with growing concern as vacuum tube production—once dominated by American firms—began shifting to Europe and Japan, threatening military and communications superiority. What followed was not free-market adjustment, but a coordinated state-industry effort to reassert control, laying the groundwork for Silicon Valley’s rise. Today, we’re seeing the same playbook: when the United States restricted exports of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines to China in 2023, it wasn’t just a trade policy—it was a declaration that AI chips are the new frontier of technological sovereignty. Like steel in the Industrial Revolution or oil in the 20th century, semiconductors have become the 'infrastructure of power,' and their supply chains are being redrawn not by efficiency, but by fear, ambition, and the timeless logic of strategic scarcity.[^1] The fragility we see today isn’t an anomaly—it’s the inevitable result of concentrating revolutionary capability in a handful of facilities, companies, and nations.
—Marcus Ashworth
Published January 24, 2026