Historical Echo: When Chips Were Weapons and Trade Deals Were Shields
![clean data visualization, flat 2D chart, muted academic palette, no 3D effects, evidence-based presentation, professional infographic, minimal decoration, clear axis labels, scholarly aesthetic, Falling and rising curves on a stark economic graph, inked lines on matte paper with precise axis labels, light from above casting soft shadows on gridlines, atmosphere of quiet urgency in a government briefing room [Bria Fibo]](https://081x4rbriqin1aej.public.blob.vercel-storage.com/viral-images/89734bc2-f630-45bf-a81e-59a1fa595b1f_viral_4_square.png "clean data visualization, flat 2D chart, muted academic palette, no 3D effects, evidence-based presentation, professional infographic, minimal decoration, clear axis labels, scholarly aesthetic, Falling and rising curves on a stark economic graph, inked lines on matte paper with precise axis labels, light from above casting soft shadows on gridlines, atmosphere of quiet urgency in a government briefing room [Bria Fibo]")
If semiconductor production remains concentrated in regions exposed to geopolitical volatility, then industrial policy will continue to prioritize proximity over cost efficiency—repeating a pattern last seen in the 1980s, when memory chip dominance shifted from the U.S. to Japan and back through calibrated trade instruments.
It’s no coincidence that the most transformative leaps in industrial policy happen not in times of peace and plenty, but in moments of perceived technological vulnerability—when a foreign rival seems poised to win the next era. In 1985, the U.S. watched helplessly as Japanese firms captured 80% of the dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) market, leading to the closure of American plants and a national panic over 'Japan Inc.' The response wasn’t free trade—it was a calibrated blend of tariffs, market-sharing agreements, and state-backed R&D that slowly reasserted U.S. dominance in logic chips even as memory slipped away. Now, in 2026, the fear is not of Tokyo, but of Taipei’s proximity to Beijing—and the nightmare scenario of a semiconductor blockade in the Taiwan Strait. So once again, the U.S. turns to the old playbook: bring the factories home, or at least bring them close enough to sleep near them. The Taiwan trade pact isn’t about tariffs; it’s about insurance. It’s about ensuring that the tiny switches powering everything from fighter jets to smart toasters aren’t held hostage by a future flashpoint 7,000 miles away. History doesn’t repeat, but it does rhyme—and this time, the rhythm is silicon. [Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 'U.S. Semiconductor Industry: Status and Competitiveness,' 1990; Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Chip Wars: U.S.-China Technological Rivalry,' 2023].
—Marcus Ashworth
Published January 25, 2026