THE LONG VIEW

Bottom Line Up Front: The United States retains immense material power, but its strategic credibility is deteriorating due to an inability to convert economic and military resources into sustained, reliable global leadership—leading allies to hedge and undermining the durability of the U.S.-led order[^1^]. Threat Identification: The primary threat is not external peer competition alone, but internal "strategic entropy"—a condition where institutional inertia, defense-industrial shortfalls, and inconsistent commitments degrade the translation of latent national power into effective, long-term deterrence and alliance cohesion[^1^]. Observable indicators include European nuclear autonomy discussions and South Korea’s debate over indigenous nuclear weapons, both reflecting diminished confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Probability Assessment: High likelihood (70–80%) that strategic entropy will worsen over the next 3–5 years (2026–2031), absent major policy shifts. Current shipyard capacity and munitions production rates are insufficient to sustain prolonged conflict or reassure allies at scale, increasing the risk of alliance fragmentation[^1^]. Impact Analysis: If unaddressed, strategic entropy could lead to the emergence of regional nuclear powers (e.g., South Korea, Japan), fracturing of NATO burden-sharing, and reduced coalition formation against revisionist states. This would effectively end the U.S.-led liberal international order, even if U.S. GDP and tech sectors remain dominant. Recommended Actions: 1. Launch a National Defense Conversion Initiative to expand shipbuilding, munitions production, and workforce capacity by 2030. 2. Establish binding U.S.-allied industrial co-production agreements to reduce reliance on unilateral U.S. surge capacity. 3. Implement a Transparent Commitment Framework—regular, high-level reaffirmations of extended deterrence with concrete force-posture milestones. 4. Create a Bipartisan Strategic Capacity Commission to align defense spending with long-term geopolitical objectives. Confidence Matrix: - Threat Identification: High confidence (based on allied policy debates and industrial data[^1^]) - Probability Assessment: Moderate-to-high confidence (dependent on current trajectory of defense spending and political stability) - Impact Analysis: Moderate confidence (contingent on escalation dynamics and allied decision-making) - Recommended Actions: High confidence in feasibility, moderate in political viability [^1^]: Alexander W. Butler, letter to The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 2026, https://www.wsj.com —Marcus Ashworth